Many in China and outside speculated that Jiang, with the support of his cronies from his native Shanghai who constituted the majority in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, would manage to retain control of the powerful armed forces by holding on to the post of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, even after ceding the posts of President and Party General Secretary to Hu.

He proved them wrong by undermining Jiang's support base in the Standing Committee and ultimately pushing him out of the post of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Hu followed a three-pronged policy in Tibet when he was in charge there -- ruthless suppression of the followers of the Dalai Lama, firm enforcement of law and order and promotion of education and economic development. He called it working with two hands -- one hand maintaining security, law and order and the other promoting development and welfare.

While the world outside knew only the details of the first two, it knew very little of the third. He, therefore, acquired a reputation as a law and order obsessed hardliner.

Many expected him to emerge as a hardliner at the national level too, but they have been proved wrong. So far as political control at the national level is concerned, his rule has been no different from that of Jiang -- strict, but not over-harsh as Hu was in Tibet. However, some Western analysts do not agree with this benign projection of Hu.

Hu knows and understands Tibet better than any other Chinese leader today and continues to take personal interest in the developments there. Even under Jiang, the central government's and the party's Tibetan policy had Hu's distinct stamp. It was he who persuaded the party and the government to refuse to recognise the Dalai Lama's nominee as the Panchen Lama, arrest him and proclaim their own nominee as the Panchen Lama after a fraudulent process of determining the re-incarnation of the previous Panchen Lama. Fears of violence in Tibet over this issue were belied. He reportedly believes that similarly after the death of the Dalai Lama, the government and party should choose his successor.

There has been speculation that the Dalai Lama intends outwitting the Chinese by proclaiming before his death that he would not be born again, thereby depriving Beijing of an opportunity to proclaim its own nominee as the 15th Dalai Lama and installing him in Lhasa.

Hu's Government is also seen as a little more transparent and a little less bureaucratic than that of his predecessor -- with the bureaucratic reflexes of covering up sins of commission and omission a little less in evidence. Faults are more readily admitted. Recently, China's news agency published many politburo standing committee meeting details. He has cut down extravagant protocols such as spectacular send-offs and welcoming-back ceremonies for him and other leaders when they go abroad.

In 2004, Hu ordered all senior leaders to stop going to the Beidaihe retreat for their expensive annual summer brainstorming sessions since he felt that it was unnecessary expenditure. His response to pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong has been measured and low key. He even withdrew a piece of legislation when large sections of the Hong Kong population protested against it as violative of their rights. Even some of his critics concede that he has handled the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong with finesse.

In the beginning of 2006, Hu launched a "8 Honours and 8 Disgraces" movement in China in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population.

Image :US President George W Bush with Hu Jintao at the White House in Washington, DC, April 20 this year.